Ballistic missiles

Showing posts with label Ballistic missiles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ballistic missiles. Show all posts

Why US May End up Backing Down as Trump/Netanyahu seem Scared of the Iranian Massive Deadly Retaliations instantly after each Attack

Why US May End up Backing Down as Trump/Netanyahu seem Scared of the Iranian Massive Deadly Retaliations instantly after each Attack

 


To destroy a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group, Iran would primarily rely on a “saturation attack” strategy.


Iran’s Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 hypersonic missiles can travel at speeds 14–15 times the speed of sound. Because of this extreme speed, radar and air-defense systems have very little time to detect and respond to them. These missiles are maneuverable within the atmosphere, allowing them to change their flight path, which helps them evade U.S. Aegis interceptor systems.


In June 2025, Iran reportedly conducted a successful test of a missile capable of carrying a 2-ton warhead. Such a massive warhead, if it directly strikes a large target like an aircraft carrier, could potentially sink the vessel or disable it by causing massive fires. Equipped with Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV) technology, these missiles are designed for high-precision strikes.


Iran can also deploy hundreds of suicide drones (such as the Shahed series) simultaneously. Their primary role would be to exhaust air-defense missiles and disable the carrier group’s radar and sensor systems.


In addition, Abu Mahdi (1,000 km range) and Noor anti-ship missiles fly extremely close to the sea surface, making them difficult to detect on radar.


Possible Iranian saturation-attack strategy against a carrier group:


Phase 1: Launch drones and anti-radiation missiles (such as Hormuz-1) to destroy or suppress the carrier group’s radar and sensor systems.


Phase 2: Fire hundreds of cruise missiles and conventional ballistic missiles to overwhelm and break through the carrier’s defensive “shield.”

Final Phase: Once defensive interceptors are depleted, deliver the main strike using hypersonic missiles with 2-ton warheads to hit the primary targets.


The hard way is the only way out for the United States of Israel's Donald Netanyahu to surrender in Peace or Else ...

 


To destroy a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group, Iran would primarily rely on a “saturation attack” strategy.


Iran’s Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 hypersonic missiles can travel at speeds 14–15 times the speed of sound. Because of this extreme speed, radar and air-defense systems have very little time to detect and respond to them. These missiles are maneuverable within the atmosphere, allowing them to change their flight path, which helps them evade U.S. Aegis interceptor systems.


In June 2025, Iran reportedly conducted a successful test of a missile capable of carrying a 2-ton warhead. Such a massive warhead, if it directly strikes a large target like an aircraft carrier, could potentially sink the vessel or disable it by causing massive fires. Equipped with Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV) technology, these missiles are designed for high-precision strikes.


Iran can also deploy hundreds of suicide drones (such as the Shahed series) simultaneously. Their primary role would be to exhaust air-defense missiles and disable the carrier group’s radar and sensor systems.


In addition, Abu Mahdi (1,000 km range) and Noor anti-ship missiles fly extremely close to the sea surface, making them difficult to detect on radar.


Possible Iranian saturation-attack strategy against a carrier group:


Phase 1: Launch drones and anti-radiation missiles (such as Hormuz-1) to destroy or suppress the carrier group’s radar and sensor systems.


Phase 2: Fire hundreds of cruise missiles and conventional ballistic missiles to overwhelm and break through the carrier’s defensive “shield.”

Final Phase: Once defensive interceptors are depleted, deliver the main strike using hypersonic missiles with 2-ton warheads to hit the primary targets.


The hard way is the only way out for the United States of Israel's Donald Netanyahu to surrender in Peace or Else ...

The Bombs That Had to Fall: America's Christmas Day Strike on Jihadist Camps in Sokoto, Seat of the Caliphate

The Bombs That Had to Fall: America's Christmas Day Strike on Jihadist Camps in Sokoto, Seat of the Caliphate


In the early hours of December 26, 2025, as most Nigerians slept off Christmas festivities, the skies over Tangaza Local Government Area in Sokoto State erupted with the thunderous roar of precision airstrikes. For 45 minutes, from 11:45 PM on December 25 to 12:30 AM, United States military aircraft unleashed what President Donald Trump described as "a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS Terrorist Scum in Northwest Nigeria."





The operation, estimated to have cost between $1 million and $3 million, marked a significant escalation in international counterterrorism efforts within Nigeria's borders. Both the U.S. Department of War and Nigeria's Foreign Minister confirmed that the strikes were a coordinated operation between the two nations, targeting a terrorist base hosting key jihadist affiliates in the Bouni axis of Tangaza.




Yet, predictably, the strikes have sparked intense debate across Nigeria. Skeptics have questioned everything from the existence of ISIS in Sokoto to the legitimacy of American military intervention on Nigerian soil. Kaduna-based Islamic cleric Sheikh Ahmed Gumi went as far as calling the operation symbolic of a "neo-Crusade war against Islam," urging Nigeria to halt all military cooperation with the United States and seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead.




But as someone who has reported extensively from Tangaza and witnessed firsthand the creeping menace of transnational jihadism in Nigeria's Northwest, I can say with confidence: these airstrikes were not only necessary, they were overdue.




The Lakurawa Threat: A Clear and Present Danger




In November 2024, my colleague Segun Onibiyo and I published an exclusive investigation into Tangaza and the alarming influx of foreign Islamist terrorists from the Sahel region into Nigeria through its porous northwestern borders. What we found was chilling: the Lakurawa terrorist group, a coalition of jihadists with ambitions to establish Islamic caliphates stretching from the Sahel down to the coast of Ghana, had been actively recruiting local fighters, including Fulani militias, across Sokoto and Kebbi states.




Tangaza, situated along Nigeria's border with Niger Republic, has become a critical transit and operational hub for these jihadists. The porosity of this border facilitates the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and ideology between the Sahel's conflict zones and Nigeria's increasingly vulnerable Northwest. This isn't speculation, it's documented reality.




The Lakurawa aren't merely bandits or cattle rustlers. They represent a sophisticated, ideologically driven terror network affiliated with Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate operating across the Sahel. Their objectives are clear: destabilize governments, impose harsh interpretations of Sharia law, and expand their territorial control. Their methods are equally clear: targeted assassinations, mass kidnappings, extortion, and brutal attacks on anyone who resists their authority, including Muslims.




Why Sokoto? Understanding the Strategic Significance




Critics have questioned why Sokoto, the historic seat of Nigeria's caliphate and a region perceived as peaceful, would be targeted. This question betrays a dangerous ignorance of contemporary jihadist strategy.




Sokoto's symbolic importance cannot be overstated. For groups like Lakurawa and their Sahel-based allies, controlling or influencing territories with deep Islamic heritage lends them religious legitimacy. Tangaza's strategic location along smuggling routes and its proximity to ungoverned spaces in Niger Republic make it an ideal staging ground for operations deeper into Nigeria.




Furthermore, the U.S. military doesn't invest millions of dollars in precision airstrikes based on hunches. In recent weeks, American forces have conducted intensive Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations across the Sahel region of Nigeria. These missions undoubtedly revealed credible intelligence about the presence of high-value terrorist targets in Tangaza, likely including senior commanders planning coordinated attacks across multiple Nigerian states.




The Sokoto State Government has confirmed that terrorist locations were indeed bombed. Reports from Niger indicate that Nigerien soldiers observed fleeing Lakurawa fighters escaping Tangaza after the strikes. The operation targeted a terrorist base where top jihadist commanders were reportedly meeting to strategize large-scale attacks. No civilian casualties were recorded, a testament to the precision and coordination involved.




Trump's "ISIS" Rhetoric: Politics Meets Reality




President Trump's characterization of the targets as "ISIS Terrorist Scum" warrants clarification. While Lakurawa is primarily affiliated with JNIM and Al-Qaeda rather than ISIS, the distinction may be more relevant to terrorism analysts than to practical counterterrorism operations. Both organizations share overlapping ideologies, tactics, and objectives. Both seek to establish Islamic caliphates through violence and terror. Both recruit from the same radicalized populations and exploit the same governance vacuums.




Trump's reference to ISIS likely serves a dual purpose: it resonates with American audiences familiar with ISIS's atrocities, and it simplifies a complex security landscape into terms that justify decisive action. For Nigerians living under the threat of these groups, whether the terrorists pledge allegiance to ISIS, Al-Qaeda, or JNIM matters far less than whether they're being effectively neutralized.




The Broader War: Why This Strike Matters




This operation represents more than just a tactical victory, it signals a renewed international commitment to confronting transnational terrorism in West Africa. For too long, Nigeria has faced these threats with insufficient resources, inadequate intelligence capabilities, and an overstretched military. The involvement of U.S. military assets, with their advanced surveillance technology, precision strike capabilities, and real-time intelligence, provides a force multiplier that Nigeria desperately needs.




The Lakurawa threat extends beyond Sokoto and Kebbi. Their influence has been felt in Zamfara, and increasingly in parts of Niger and Kwara States. They operate with impunity in areas where state presence is minimal or non-existent. They impose taxes on communities, recruit disaffected youth, and coordinate with local bandits to create a complex web of criminality and ideological extremism.




Sheikh Gumi's concerns about sovereignty and the symbolism of American intervention are not without merit in principle. No nation should casually cede control of military operations within its borders. However, his suggestion that "terrorists don't fight terrorists" ignores the fundamental difference between legitimate counterterrorism operations conducted with host-nation consent and the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by jihadist groups.




His recommendation that Nigeria seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead raises its own questions. Are these nations better positioned to provide the sophisticated ISR capabilities, precision strike assets, and actionable intelligence that this operation demonstrated? The evidence suggests otherwise.




Looking Forward: Recommendations for Sustained Action




While the Tangaza strikes represent a significant achievement, they cannot be a one-off event. Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy must evolve to address the full spectrum of jihadist threats across the country.



The next priority should be the systematic dismantling of known terror cells in the Middle Belt, particularly in Nasarawa, Plateau, Benue, and Taraba states. These cells serve as planning and staging grounds for attacks on farming communities that have displaced thousands and devastated agricultural production. Precision airstrikes targeting these locations, combined with ground operations to clear and hold territory, would significantly degrade their operational capacity.




Nigeria must also invest in border security infrastructure along its northern frontiers. Technology, surveillance drones, biometric checkpoints, rapid response units, must replace the current patchwork of undermanned outposts. Regional cooperation with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon needs strengthening to create a coordinated response to groups that exploit national boundaries.




Finally, Nigeria must address the governance vacuums that make communities vulnerable to jihadist recruitment. Where the state is absent, in providing security, justice, education, and economic opportunity, extremist groups fill the void. Long-term victory against terrorism requires not just military action but the restoration of effective governance.




Conclusion: A Necessary Strike in a Long War




The Christmas Day airstrikes in Tangaza were not an American crusade against Islam, as some have claimed. They were a necessary surgical intervention against a metastasizing terrorist threat that endangers Muslims and Christians alike. The Lakurawa and their affiliates have killed indiscriminately, enslaved communities, and sought to drag Nigeria into the chaos consuming the Sahel.




Those who doubt the necessity or success of these strikes should ask themselves: Would they prefer that the terrorists meeting in that Tangaza forest had been left to execute whatever atrocities they were planning? Would they prefer that Nigeria face these transnational threats entirely alone, without the intelligence and capabilities that international partnerships provide?




The war against terrorism in Nigeria is far from over. But on December 25, 2025, in the skies over Sokoto, a significant battle was won. Now comes the harder work: sustaining the pressure, expanding operations to other terrorist strongholds, and building the state capacity necessary to ensure that when terrorists are eliminated, they cannot simply be replaced.




The strike in Tangaza matters because it demonstrates that Nigeria is not alone in this fight, and that those who wage jihad against innocent Nigerians, regardless of their religious affiliation or international backing, will face consequences.




The question now is whether Nigeria has the political will to build on this success or whether the Tangaza strikes will remain an isolated event in an otherwise reactive and inadequate counterterrorism strategy.




For the sake of every Nigerian farmer, trader, student, and family living under the shadow of these groups, we must choose the former.





Steven Kefas is an investigative journalist, Senior Research Analyst at the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa, and Publisher of Middle Belt Times. He has documented religious persecution, terrorism and forced displacement in Nigeria’s Middle Belt for over a decade.



In the early hours of December 26, 2025, as most Nigerians slept off Christmas festivities, the skies over Tangaza Local Government Area in Sokoto State erupted with the thunderous roar of precision airstrikes. For 45 minutes, from 11:45 PM on December 25 to 12:30 AM, United States military aircraft unleashed what President Donald Trump described as "a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS Terrorist Scum in Northwest Nigeria."





The operation, estimated to have cost between $1 million and $3 million, marked a significant escalation in international counterterrorism efforts within Nigeria's borders. Both the U.S. Department of War and Nigeria's Foreign Minister confirmed that the strikes were a coordinated operation between the two nations, targeting a terrorist base hosting key jihadist affiliates in the Bouni axis of Tangaza.




Yet, predictably, the strikes have sparked intense debate across Nigeria. Skeptics have questioned everything from the existence of ISIS in Sokoto to the legitimacy of American military intervention on Nigerian soil. Kaduna-based Islamic cleric Sheikh Ahmed Gumi went as far as calling the operation symbolic of a "neo-Crusade war against Islam," urging Nigeria to halt all military cooperation with the United States and seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead.




But as someone who has reported extensively from Tangaza and witnessed firsthand the creeping menace of transnational jihadism in Nigeria's Northwest, I can say with confidence: these airstrikes were not only necessary, they were overdue.




The Lakurawa Threat: A Clear and Present Danger




In November 2024, my colleague Segun Onibiyo and I published an exclusive investigation into Tangaza and the alarming influx of foreign Islamist terrorists from the Sahel region into Nigeria through its porous northwestern borders. What we found was chilling: the Lakurawa terrorist group, a coalition of jihadists with ambitions to establish Islamic caliphates stretching from the Sahel down to the coast of Ghana, had been actively recruiting local fighters, including Fulani militias, across Sokoto and Kebbi states.




Tangaza, situated along Nigeria's border with Niger Republic, has become a critical transit and operational hub for these jihadists. The porosity of this border facilitates the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and ideology between the Sahel's conflict zones and Nigeria's increasingly vulnerable Northwest. This isn't speculation, it's documented reality.




The Lakurawa aren't merely bandits or cattle rustlers. They represent a sophisticated, ideologically driven terror network affiliated with Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate operating across the Sahel. Their objectives are clear: destabilize governments, impose harsh interpretations of Sharia law, and expand their territorial control. Their methods are equally clear: targeted assassinations, mass kidnappings, extortion, and brutal attacks on anyone who resists their authority, including Muslims.




Why Sokoto? Understanding the Strategic Significance




Critics have questioned why Sokoto, the historic seat of Nigeria's caliphate and a region perceived as peaceful, would be targeted. This question betrays a dangerous ignorance of contemporary jihadist strategy.




Sokoto's symbolic importance cannot be overstated. For groups like Lakurawa and their Sahel-based allies, controlling or influencing territories with deep Islamic heritage lends them religious legitimacy. Tangaza's strategic location along smuggling routes and its proximity to ungoverned spaces in Niger Republic make it an ideal staging ground for operations deeper into Nigeria.




Furthermore, the U.S. military doesn't invest millions of dollars in precision airstrikes based on hunches. In recent weeks, American forces have conducted intensive Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations across the Sahel region of Nigeria. These missions undoubtedly revealed credible intelligence about the presence of high-value terrorist targets in Tangaza, likely including senior commanders planning coordinated attacks across multiple Nigerian states.




The Sokoto State Government has confirmed that terrorist locations were indeed bombed. Reports from Niger indicate that Nigerien soldiers observed fleeing Lakurawa fighters escaping Tangaza after the strikes. The operation targeted a terrorist base where top jihadist commanders were reportedly meeting to strategize large-scale attacks. No civilian casualties were recorded, a testament to the precision and coordination involved.




Trump's "ISIS" Rhetoric: Politics Meets Reality




President Trump's characterization of the targets as "ISIS Terrorist Scum" warrants clarification. While Lakurawa is primarily affiliated with JNIM and Al-Qaeda rather than ISIS, the distinction may be more relevant to terrorism analysts than to practical counterterrorism operations. Both organizations share overlapping ideologies, tactics, and objectives. Both seek to establish Islamic caliphates through violence and terror. Both recruit from the same radicalized populations and exploit the same governance vacuums.




Trump's reference to ISIS likely serves a dual purpose: it resonates with American audiences familiar with ISIS's atrocities, and it simplifies a complex security landscape into terms that justify decisive action. For Nigerians living under the threat of these groups, whether the terrorists pledge allegiance to ISIS, Al-Qaeda, or JNIM matters far less than whether they're being effectively neutralized.




The Broader War: Why This Strike Matters




This operation represents more than just a tactical victory, it signals a renewed international commitment to confronting transnational terrorism in West Africa. For too long, Nigeria has faced these threats with insufficient resources, inadequate intelligence capabilities, and an overstretched military. The involvement of U.S. military assets, with their advanced surveillance technology, precision strike capabilities, and real-time intelligence, provides a force multiplier that Nigeria desperately needs.




The Lakurawa threat extends beyond Sokoto and Kebbi. Their influence has been felt in Zamfara, and increasingly in parts of Niger and Kwara States. They operate with impunity in areas where state presence is minimal or non-existent. They impose taxes on communities, recruit disaffected youth, and coordinate with local bandits to create a complex web of criminality and ideological extremism.




Sheikh Gumi's concerns about sovereignty and the symbolism of American intervention are not without merit in principle. No nation should casually cede control of military operations within its borders. However, his suggestion that "terrorists don't fight terrorists" ignores the fundamental difference between legitimate counterterrorism operations conducted with host-nation consent and the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by jihadist groups.




His recommendation that Nigeria seek assistance from China, Turkey, or Pakistan instead raises its own questions. Are these nations better positioned to provide the sophisticated ISR capabilities, precision strike assets, and actionable intelligence that this operation demonstrated? The evidence suggests otherwise.




Looking Forward: Recommendations for Sustained Action




While the Tangaza strikes represent a significant achievement, they cannot be a one-off event. Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy must evolve to address the full spectrum of jihadist threats across the country.



The next priority should be the systematic dismantling of known terror cells in the Middle Belt, particularly in Nasarawa, Plateau, Benue, and Taraba states. These cells serve as planning and staging grounds for attacks on farming communities that have displaced thousands and devastated agricultural production. Precision airstrikes targeting these locations, combined with ground operations to clear and hold territory, would significantly degrade their operational capacity.




Nigeria must also invest in border security infrastructure along its northern frontiers. Technology, surveillance drones, biometric checkpoints, rapid response units, must replace the current patchwork of undermanned outposts. Regional cooperation with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon needs strengthening to create a coordinated response to groups that exploit national boundaries.




Finally, Nigeria must address the governance vacuums that make communities vulnerable to jihadist recruitment. Where the state is absent, in providing security, justice, education, and economic opportunity, extremist groups fill the void. Long-term victory against terrorism requires not just military action but the restoration of effective governance.




Conclusion: A Necessary Strike in a Long War




The Christmas Day airstrikes in Tangaza were not an American crusade against Islam, as some have claimed. They were a necessary surgical intervention against a metastasizing terrorist threat that endangers Muslims and Christians alike. The Lakurawa and their affiliates have killed indiscriminately, enslaved communities, and sought to drag Nigeria into the chaos consuming the Sahel.




Those who doubt the necessity or success of these strikes should ask themselves: Would they prefer that the terrorists meeting in that Tangaza forest had been left to execute whatever atrocities they were planning? Would they prefer that Nigeria face these transnational threats entirely alone, without the intelligence and capabilities that international partnerships provide?




The war against terrorism in Nigeria is far from over. But on December 25, 2025, in the skies over Sokoto, a significant battle was won. Now comes the harder work: sustaining the pressure, expanding operations to other terrorist strongholds, and building the state capacity necessary to ensure that when terrorists are eliminated, they cannot simply be replaced.




The strike in Tangaza matters because it demonstrates that Nigeria is not alone in this fight, and that those who wage jihad against innocent Nigerians, regardless of their religious affiliation or international backing, will face consequences.




The question now is whether Nigeria has the political will to build on this success or whether the Tangaza strikes will remain an isolated event in an otherwise reactive and inadequate counterterrorism strategy.




For the sake of every Nigerian farmer, trader, student, and family living under the shadow of these groups, we must choose the former.





Steven Kefas is an investigative journalist, Senior Research Analyst at the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa, and Publisher of Middle Belt Times. He has documented religious persecution, terrorism and forced displacement in Nigeria’s Middle Belt for over a decade.


Israeli website "Hess"hacked: Over 1300 killed by Iranian Missiles in Israel

Israeli website "Hess"hacked: Over 1300 killed by Iranian Missiles in Israel

 


 


Netayahu's Misadventures Against Iran, Israelis Still Calculating Losses

Netayahu's Misadventures Against Iran, Israelis Still Calculating Losses


Israel entered the 12-day exchange convinced it could absorb costs; the ledger now shows a nation bleeding cash, talent, and confidence. 


Direct military outlays hit $5 B in the first week, then ballooned to $725 M every 24 hours, $593 M on offensive strikes that failed to silence Iran, $132 M on frantic mobilisation and missile intercepts that still let 400 warheads through. 


Iron Dome batteries alone inhaled $10 M to $200 M per day while Iranian salvos sailed past them and erased $1.47 B in civilian property, triggering 38 700 damage claims, 11 000 evacuations, and 30 condemned high-rise skeletons across Tel Aviv’s financial spine.


The Weizmann Institute, Israel’s prestige export, lies in shards, 45 labs gone and $500 M in biomedical IP incinerated, pulling decades of grant pipelines and pharma partnerships off the table overnight.


Intel’s Kiryat Gat fabs froze mid-wafer, choking a supply chain that feeds 64% of Israel’s exports and 1/5 of its GDP; the high-tech sector now runs on skeleton crews because 300 000 reservists were yanked from R&D floors and data centers to guard empty runways at Tel Nof. Commercial flights halted twice at Ben Gurion, insurers jacked premiums, and foreign airlines rerouted around a country that once sold itself as the region’s safe hub.


Capital is already in flight. More than 80 000 Israelis emigrated in 2024, the largest outflow since 1948, pushing the two-year total above 500 000 and forcing Netanyahu’s cabinet to slap a travel ban on Jewish dual nationals to stem the leak. Investor confidence cratered: venture funds paused term sheets, construction sites stand idle, and mega-projects wait on credit that no longer clears. 


The finance ministry, staring at a deficit set to shove public debt past 75 % of GDP, begged for an extra $857 M in defence cash while slicing $200 M from hospitals and schools.


Analysts peg Israel’s aggregate loss between $11.5 B and $17.8 B, up to 3.3 % of GDP, before counting long-tail hits from halted exports, cancelled IPOs, and sovereign-risk downgrades. 


Iran, still sitting on its uranium stockpile, spent a fraction of that yet forced the self-styled “Start-Up Nation” into a liquidity scramble, an insurance panic, and a brain-drain spiral. 


Tel Aviv promised deterrence;


 Tehran handed it a balance sheet in red ink and the visible stamp of strategic humiliation. 


—Thomas Keith




Israel entered the 12-day exchange convinced it could absorb costs; the ledger now shows a nation bleeding cash, talent, and confidence. 


Direct military outlays hit $5 B in the first week, then ballooned to $725 M every 24 hours, $593 M on offensive strikes that failed to silence Iran, $132 M on frantic mobilisation and missile intercepts that still let 400 warheads through. 


Iron Dome batteries alone inhaled $10 M to $200 M per day while Iranian salvos sailed past them and erased $1.47 B in civilian property, triggering 38 700 damage claims, 11 000 evacuations, and 30 condemned high-rise skeletons across Tel Aviv’s financial spine.


The Weizmann Institute, Israel’s prestige export, lies in shards, 45 labs gone and $500 M in biomedical IP incinerated, pulling decades of grant pipelines and pharma partnerships off the table overnight.


Intel’s Kiryat Gat fabs froze mid-wafer, choking a supply chain that feeds 64% of Israel’s exports and 1/5 of its GDP; the high-tech sector now runs on skeleton crews because 300 000 reservists were yanked from R&D floors and data centers to guard empty runways at Tel Nof. Commercial flights halted twice at Ben Gurion, insurers jacked premiums, and foreign airlines rerouted around a country that once sold itself as the region’s safe hub.


Capital is already in flight. More than 80 000 Israelis emigrated in 2024, the largest outflow since 1948, pushing the two-year total above 500 000 and forcing Netanyahu’s cabinet to slap a travel ban on Jewish dual nationals to stem the leak. Investor confidence cratered: venture funds paused term sheets, construction sites stand idle, and mega-projects wait on credit that no longer clears. 


The finance ministry, staring at a deficit set to shove public debt past 75 % of GDP, begged for an extra $857 M in defence cash while slicing $200 M from hospitals and schools.


Analysts peg Israel’s aggregate loss between $11.5 B and $17.8 B, up to 3.3 % of GDP, before counting long-tail hits from halted exports, cancelled IPOs, and sovereign-risk downgrades. 


Iran, still sitting on its uranium stockpile, spent a fraction of that yet forced the self-styled “Start-Up Nation” into a liquidity scramble, an insurance panic, and a brain-drain spiral. 


Tel Aviv promised deterrence;


 Tehran handed it a balance sheet in red ink and the visible stamp of strategic humiliation. 


—Thomas Keith



Iran moving uranium from nuclear sites bombed by American Army

Iran moving uranium from nuclear sites bombed by American Army

 


 


We wanted to assassinate (Sayyed) Ali Khamenei, but we couldn't reach him — Israel's Defense Minister Yisrael Says

We wanted to assassinate (Sayyed) Ali Khamenei, but we couldn't reach him — Israel's Defense Minister Yisrael Says

 


The idea that US President Donald Trump declined Israel's request to kill the Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah  (Sayyed) Ali Khamenei was a hoax. The Israeli forces were unable to actually get to him.


Killing the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran would have either end or prolonged the war in favour of the State of Israel.

Isreali Defense Minister confirmed that they were unable to get to the spiritual leader of the Iranian people.

 


The idea that US President Donald Trump declined Israel's request to kill the Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah  (Sayyed) Ali Khamenei was a hoax. The Israeli forces were unable to actually get to him.


Killing the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran would have either end or prolonged the war in favour of the State of Israel.

Isreali Defense Minister confirmed that they were unable to get to the spiritual leader of the Iranian people.

Israel-Iran War: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netayahu May God Down

Israel-Iran War: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netayahu May God Down

 


 


Israel-Iran War: Iran Ballistic missiles Killed 28 Israelis, 3,000 wounded, 31,000 buildings Damaged,4,000 vehicles destroyed

Israel-Iran War: Iran Ballistic missiles Killed 28 Israelis, 3,000 wounded, 31,000 buildings Damaged,4,000 vehicles destroyed


The audacious temerity with which authority in Tel Aviv declears and attacks Iran melted away as With few days as Tehran responses to Benjamin Netayahu invasion was beyond imagination.


Ceasefire came into effect without Iran surrender or conceding to US or Israel's demands. All of the war objectives were never achieved.


Just as Ukraine was tested before the Russian fire, Israel attempted the baptism of fire from Iran but quickly retreated though damages of great magnitudes have been recorded on both sides.


Counting the lost, Israeli authority confirmed that Iran’s ballistic missile strikes on Israel during 12 days of war killed 28 people, all but one of them civilians, and left more than 3,000 wounded.


According to the Israeli Health Ministry 3,238 people were hospitalized over the course of the attacks.


 Among them, 23 were seriously injured, 111 sustained moderate wounds, 2,933 were lightly hurt, and 138 were treated for acute anxiety. The condition of 30 others remained undetermined.


 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that Tehran launched approximately 550 ballistic missiles and around 1,000 drones at Israel. Not less than 31 ballistic missile impacts were recorded in populated areas or at critical infrastructure sites, including a power station in southern Israel, an oil refinery in Haifa, and a university in central Israel. 


Reports indicated that 31,000 buildings were damaged and 4,000 vehicles destroyed as a result of the war with Iran, according to Israel’s Channel 12.


Israel may never try attacking Iran again, not in any possible nearest time.


Also, the Israeli Minister of Finance officially announced that the cost of the operation against Iran is estimated at around $5.4 billion, and the damages caused by missile impacts are estimated at $1.35 billion!


This is just the officially announced figure by the Zionist regime, and it seems that the unofficial numbers are much higher than this!


As for the Iranian estimation of casualties and damages are expected to by humugu.  As for the cost of prosecuting their resistance defence against Israel, it should be far less to Israel's estimation.


Meanwhile, Iranian ministry of health reports 610 causalities, 4,746 wounded, 971 currently hospitalised while 687 underwent surgery. 

It's a public knowledge that three Iranian Nuclear Sites were destroyed by the United States during the war with US direct attacks on Iran. Many other public buildings including Iran's broadcasting cooperations among others.



Last Updated: June 26th, 2025.




The audacious temerity with which authority in Tel Aviv declears and attacks Iran melted away as With few days as Tehran responses to Benjamin Netayahu invasion was beyond imagination.


Ceasefire came into effect without Iran surrender or conceding to US or Israel's demands. All of the war objectives were never achieved.


Just as Ukraine was tested before the Russian fire, Israel attempted the baptism of fire from Iran but quickly retreated though damages of great magnitudes have been recorded on both sides.


Counting the lost, Israeli authority confirmed that Iran’s ballistic missile strikes on Israel during 12 days of war killed 28 people, all but one of them civilians, and left more than 3,000 wounded.


According to the Israeli Health Ministry 3,238 people were hospitalized over the course of the attacks.


 Among them, 23 were seriously injured, 111 sustained moderate wounds, 2,933 were lightly hurt, and 138 were treated for acute anxiety. The condition of 30 others remained undetermined.


 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that Tehran launched approximately 550 ballistic missiles and around 1,000 drones at Israel. Not less than 31 ballistic missile impacts were recorded in populated areas or at critical infrastructure sites, including a power station in southern Israel, an oil refinery in Haifa, and a university in central Israel. 


Reports indicated that 31,000 buildings were damaged and 4,000 vehicles destroyed as a result of the war with Iran, according to Israel’s Channel 12.


Israel may never try attacking Iran again, not in any possible nearest time.


Also, the Israeli Minister of Finance officially announced that the cost of the operation against Iran is estimated at around $5.4 billion, and the damages caused by missile impacts are estimated at $1.35 billion!


This is just the officially announced figure by the Zionist regime, and it seems that the unofficial numbers are much higher than this!


As for the Iranian estimation of casualties and damages are expected to by humugu.  As for the cost of prosecuting their resistance defence against Israel, it should be far less to Israel's estimation.


Meanwhile, Iranian ministry of health reports 610 causalities, 4,746 wounded, 971 currently hospitalised while 687 underwent surgery. 

It's a public knowledge that three Iranian Nuclear Sites were destroyed by the United States during the war with US direct attacks on Iran. Many other public buildings including Iran's broadcasting cooperations among others.



Last Updated: June 26th, 2025.



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